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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The present case is a consolidation of two cases brought by the Plaintiffs/Appellants.

The first case (Franklin County Case No. CV-2015-00132) was brought by the
Plaintiffs/Appellants against ROBERT TALBOT and MICHELE TALBOT, (hereafter the
“Talbots”) who are the neighbors of the Plaintiffs/Appellants. This case is about a boundary line
dispute. The Talbots filed an Answer and a Counterclaim to quiet title to the boundary line.
The second case (Franklin County Case No. CV-2015-00164) was brought by the
Plaintiffs/Appellants against PAUL PARKER and SAUNDRA PARKER (hereafter the
“Parkers”), who sold the home to the Plaintiffs/Appellants that they currently live in next to the
Talbots. This case raised a Warranty of Title claim and a damage claim for mold, water damage,
fraud and failure to disclose to which the Parkers filed an Answer denying all
Plaintiffs/Appellants’ claims. Plaintiffs/Appellants later voluntarily dismissed the damage claim
for mold, water damage, fraud and failure to disclose leaving only the Warranty of Title claim. 1
These two cases were consolidated on April 19, 2016 into the present litigation because
the boundary line issue is mutual between the Plaintiffs/Appellants and the Talbots and Parkers.2
During the course of the litigation the Plaintiffs/Appellants filed a Motion to Disqualify
the counsel representing the Talbots and the Parkers on the basis of what the

1
2

R. at 638.
R. at 281.

3

Plaintiffs/Appellants claim is a conflict of interest based on a Rule of Professional Conduct.3
The Talbots and the Parkers filed an Opposition and also made oral arguments at the hearing on
the Motion to Disqualify. On April 19, 2016, the District Court held a hearing and then entered a
Minute Entry and Order denying Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Motion to Disqualify the counsel
representing the Talbots and the Parkers.4
On August 15, 2016 the Talbots and Parkers filed an Amended Motion for Summary
Judgment and a Brief in support of summary judgment asking the District Court to enter an order
establishing the boundary line between the Talbots and Plaintiffs/Appellants and seeking to
dismiss all claims raised by the Plaintiffs/Appellants against the Talbots and the Parkers.5 The
Plaintiffs/Appellants filed a late Cross Motion for Summary Judgment 6 which was opposed by
the Talbots and the Parkers for being late.7 The parties filed various Responses and Replies as
well as various Motions to Strike.8
The District Court denied Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on
the basis that it was filed late with no good cause shown.9 The District Court then entered its
Memorandum Decision and Order on the Talbots’ and Parkers’ Amended Motion for Summary

3

R. at 264-269.
R. at 281-283.
5
R. at 357-358, and at 359-383 respectively.
6
R. at 523-525.
7
R. at 571-581.
8
R. at 359-383, and 523-615.
9
R. at 616-617, and 638.
4

4

Judgment in favor of the Talbots and against the Plaintiffs/Appellants.10 On October 12, 2016,
the District Court entered a final Judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.11
On October 13, 2016, Plaintiffs/Appellants filed a Motion for New Trial or to Alter or
Amend Judgment12 with an accompanying Brief.13 However, the only reason for doing this was
that the Plaintiffs/Appellants argued that the District Court had not addressed the Warranty of
Title issue that was pending against the Parkers in its original Memorandum Decision and
Order.14 The Plaintiffs/Appellants never asked the District Court to alter or amend its October
12, 2016 Memorandum Decision and Order. On December 15, 2016, the District Court entered
its Memorandum Decision and Order on the Motion for New Trial or to Alter or Amend
Judgment and ruled against the Plaintiffs/Appellants and in favor of the Parkers.15
On January 17, 2017, the Plaintiffs/Appellants filed an appeal on “the Memorandum
Decision and Order dated December 15, 2016, by the Honorable Judge Robert C. Naftz presiding, and all
preceding orders and rulings.”16

10

R. at 637-650.
R. at 651-652.
12
R. at 654-655.
13
R. at 656-671.
14
R. at 656-671.
15
R. at 724-730.
16
R. at 731-734.
11
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II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following statement of facts evidences that there are no genuine issues of material

fact that would preclude the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Talbots
and the Parkers. The Plaintiffs/Appellants have failed to present any evidence that disputes the
following facts which are all supported by the record before this Court. These facts, with
references to the record, are as follows:
On or about April 5, 1972, Myrtle Ransom deeded certain real property located in
Franklin County, Idaho to Howard Almond. This transfer of real property was made by warranty
deed, a true and correct copy of which is attached to Plaintiffs’ Complaint as Exhibit “A” which
is incorporated herein by reference as if set forth fully.17
On or about July 2, 1979 Howard Almond and Laura Almond deeded the real property to
Craig and to Sue Shaffer by warranty deed recorded on July 11, 1979, as Franklin County
Recorder’s Instrument No. 150231, which was later modified by that certain correction warranty
deed recorded on October 2, 1981 as Franklin County Recorder’s Instrument No. 157161. (See
Plaintiff’s Complaint Exhibits “B” and “C” and the Affidavit of Craig Shaffer, (hereafter Shaffer
Affidavit).)18

17
18

R. at 13 and 19-20.
R. at 13, 21-24, and 152-154.
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A portion of the property owned by the Shaffers was enclosed by a fence, because it had
been used for several years as a pasture by the Almonds. (See Shaffer Affidavit.)19
Craig and Sue Shaffer decided to split the property into two pieces with one piece being
the area enclosed by the fence (hereafter the “Talbot Property”), and the remainder being the
other piece (hereafter the “Nielson Property”).

(See Shaffer Affidavit and Plaintiff’s

Complaint.)20
On or about January 17, 1985, Craig and Sue Shaffer sold the property enclosed by the
fence, the Talbot Property, to Suel Murdock and Gae Murdock by Quit Claim Deed which was
recorded as Instrument No. 168360.

(See Plaintiff’s Complaint, Exhibit “J” and Shaffer

Affidavit.)21
In selling the Talbot Property to Suel Murdock and Gae Murdock, it was agreed between
the Shaffers and the Murdocks that the Murdocks were purchasing all of the property enclosed
by the fence (the Talbot Property). The Shaffers agreed with the Murdocks that the fenceline
would be the property boundary line which divided the Talbot Property from the Nielson
Property. (See Shaffer Affidavit and Gae Murdock Affidavit.)22
To separate the properties, the Shaffers and the Murdocks then jointly created a legal
description for the Talbot Property that was included in the Deed from the Shaffers to the

19

R. at 152-154.
R. at 13-14, and 152-154.
21
R. at 13-14, 40-41, and 152-154.
22
R. at 147-148, and 152-154.
20
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Murdocks which the Shaffers and the Murdocks all believed reflected their agreement of having
the fenceline be the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property. (See
Shaffer Affidavit and Gae Murdock Affidavit.)23
The fenceline was maintained as the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the
Nielson Property by the Shaffers and the Murdocks the entire time that these parties owned their
respective properties, as described above. (See Shaffer Affidavit and Gae Murdock Affidavit.)24
On September 22, 1986, Dr. Phil Cromwell and Sherry Cromwell, (hereafter the
“Cromwells”) obtained the Nielson property from the Shaffers which was subsequently then
deeded in turn to the Heaps, the Parkers and then finally to the Plaintiffs/Appellants. This was
accomplished by the Deeds attached to Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Complaint as Exhibits “D”, “E”,
“F”, “G” and “H” which are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth fully. 25 A summary
of these transfers of ownership of the Nielson property is also contained in the Timeline of
Ownership of the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property attached to the Erickson Affidavit as
Exhibit “4”.26
When the Cromwells purchased the Nielson property, the property next door (the Talbot
Property) was pasture land with a fence that created a boundary between the Nielson Property
and the pasture land (the Talbot Property). A legal description was included in the Deed to the

23

R. at 147-148, and 152-154.
R. at 147-148, and 152-154.
25
R. at 25-37.
26
R. at 406-514, and specifically 410.
24
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Cromwells that they believed reflected the fenceline as the boundary line between their property
(the Nielson Property) and the property owned by the Murdocks (the Talbot Property) on the
other side of the fence. After purchasing the Nielson Property, the Cromwells immediately
began watering and maintaining the grass and yard up to the fenceline. On the other side of the
fence, the property owned by the Murdocks (the Talbot Property) was bare dirt, weeds, and
pasture. (See Affidavit of Phil Cromwell, hereafter the “Cromwell Affidavit”).27
Dr. Cromwell personally planted a number of lilac bushes on the Nielson Property up to
the fenceline to create a sort of natural privacy barrier between the properties. These lilac bushes
were planted along the boundary line between the Nielson property and the property owned by
the Murdocks (the Talbot Property) towards the front and extending down the boundary line
approximately a to ½ of the way. Dr. Cromwell then personally maintained the grass, lilac
bushes and yard up to the fenceline for several years. (See Cromwell Affidavit.)28
In August 1992, the Murdocks sold their pasture land surrounded by the fence (the Talbot
Property) to Vince Whitehead.29 Mr. Whitehead took down the fence and immediately built a
home which he then sold to Dave & Brenda Larsen in February 1993. 30 When Mr. Whitehead
sold the property to the Larsens, the home was completed but no landscaping had been done.31
At this time a clear boundary line existed between the Nielson Property and the Talbot Property

27

R. at 398-402.
R. at 398-402.
29
R. at 148.
30
R. at 399 and 403.
31
R. at 404.
28
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because there were lilac bushes and maintained yard and grass on the Nielson property and bare
dirt on Mr. Whitehead’s property (the Talbot property). (See Cromwell Affidavit.)32
After purchasing his property in February 1993, Mr. Larsen and Dr. Cromwell discussed
his landscaping of his property (the Nielson Property) up to the boundary line that had been
defined by the previous fence. At the time of this conversation a clear boundary line established
by the fence still existed between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property because of the
lilac bushes, groomed grass and yard that Dr. Cromwell had maintained up to the fence line, and
the bare ground that was on Mr. Larsen’s property (the Talbot Property). (See Cromwell
Affidavit.)33
A legal description was included in the Deed for the Larsens that they believed reflected
the clear boundary line that existed between their property (Talbot property) and the Cromwell’s
property (Neilson property). (See Affidavit of Dave Larsen, hereafter Larsen Affidavit.)
Mr. Larsen then installed a sprinkler system and grass up to the boundary line of the
Cromwell’s lilac bushes, grass and yard essentially landscaping all of the bare ground and
continuing the boundary line between the Nielson property and the Talbot property. (See Larsen
Affidavit.)34
After this was done, Mr. Larsen maintained his yard (the Talbot Property) and
Dr. Cromwell maintained his yard (the Nielson Property) for several years. The boundary line

32

R. at 399.
R. at 399.
34
R. at 403-405.
33
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between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property was always exactly where the fence had
been the entire time the Cromwells owned the Nielson property and the Larsens owned the
Talbot property. (See Cromwell Affidavit.)35
While they owned the Talbot Property, the Larsens also built a shed on the back corner.
The shed was built so that the back side of it was on the boundary line. (See Cromwell and
Larsen Affidavits.)36
The Talbots purchased the Talbot Property from the Larsens on August 11, 1995. At this
time, the boundary line between the properties was well defined by the lilac bushes, grass, yards,
sprinkler system, and shed that existed on the Talbot property or the Cromwell’s property
(Neilson property). (See Plaintiff’s Complaint Exhibit “L”, Michele Talbot Affidavit, Robert
Talbot Affidavit, Cromwell Affidavit and Larsen Affidavit.)37
A legal description was included in the Deed for the Talbot’s property that they believed
reflected the boundary line between our property and the Cromwell’s property that was well
defined by the lilac bushes, grass, yards, sprinkler system, and shed that existed on either our
property or the Cromwell’s property (Nielson property). (See Robert Talbot Affidavit.)38
The Talbots and the Cromwells then discussed the Talbots installing a carport on their
property up to the boundary line, next to the lilac bushes. They discussed how the carport would

35

R. at 398-402.
R. at 398-402, and 403-405 respectively.
37
R. at 44-45, 149-151, 384-397, 398-402, and 403-405.
38
R. at 384-397.
36
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look. They also discussed that it would be on the boundary line between the properties, right
next to the lilac bushes that the Cromwells had planted. After discussing this, the Cromwells
gave their permission to allow the Talbots to build the carport as described. (See Robert Talbot
and Cromwell Affidavits.)39
The Talbots installed the driveway and carport just as we had discussed. (See Robert
Talbot Affidavit and photographs attached as Exhibits “1”, “2”, and “3”.)40
The Cromwells lived on their property (the Nielson Property) for nearly 20 years. The
Talbots were the Cromwells neighbors for nearly 10 years. During all of this time the boundary
line that existed between the Cromwells (the Nielson Property) and the Talbot Property was
always the same and was defined by the fence, or once it was removed, by the lilacs, grass,
yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport that took its place. Every neighbor the
Cromwells had that lived on the Talbot property, including the Talbots, agreed to the boundary
line through their maintenance of the boundary line. There was never any dispute about the
boundary line between the properties. (See Cromwell Affidavit.)41
On July 2, 2004, the Cromwells’ sold their property (the Nielson Property) to Jared
Heaps & Marisa Heaps. Who owned the property for about 2 years. The Heaps then sold the
property (the Nielson Property) to the Parkers on August 17, 2006. The Talbots and their
neighbors, the Heaps and the Parkers all maintained the boundary line as established by the

39

R. at 384-397, and 398-402.
R. at 384-397.
41
R. at 398-402.
40
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lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport. There was never any dispute
or disagreement about the boundary line between the properties.42
The Parkers sold the Nielson property to the Plaintiffs/Appellants in August 2013. (See
Plaintiffs Complaint.)43
In June 2014, the Plaintiffs/Appellants became the owners of the Nielson Property
adjacent to that of the Talbot Property.

Immediately upon obtaining ownership,

Plaintiffs/Appellants claimed to have learned that the legal description they obtained through
their warranty deed entitled them to those portions of the Talbot Property that have the
Defendants’ sprinkler system, shrubs and/or trees and also has the shed and the carport on them.
The Plaintiffs/Appellants, became irate and demanded that the Talbots remove all of these
improvements from the property. (See Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Complaint and Michele Talbot
Affidavit.)44
Before this, there was never any dispute about the boundary line of the Talbot Property
and the Nielson Property between the Talbots or any of their neighbors until nearly 20 years after
the Talbots purchased their property. (See Robert Talbot Affidavit.)45

42

R. at 386.
R. at 12.
44
R. at 12, and 149-151.
45
R. at 384-397.
43
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In August 2014, Cheryl Nielson began cutting down the lilac bushes that had been part of
the boundary line the entire time both the Cromwells and the Talbots had lived in their respective
properties. (See Cromwell Affidavit and Robert Talbot Affidavit.)46
Photographs show how the lilac bushes looked for many years, and also how the property
looked after the lilac bushes were cut down. (See Robert Talbot Affidavit and attached Exhibits
“1”, “2”, and “3”.)47
Photographs also show the location of the driveway, carport and shed that are located on
the Talbot property, and which were part of the boundary line that was first established by the
fence when it existed. (See Affidavit of Robert Talbot with attached Exhibits “1”, “2”, and “3”,
and Affidavits of Cromwell, and Larsen.)48
These same photographs also accurately show the boundary line as established by the
lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport that were maintained from the
beginning of the time the properties were divided by a fence and as the boundary line existed
thereafter for over 20 years. (See Affidavit of Robert Talbot with attached Exhibits “1”, “2”, and
“3”, and Affidavits of Cromwell, and Larsen.)49
A timeline of Ownership of the Talbot property and the Nielson property is provided to
the Court as a visual aid in understanding the establishing and maintaining of the boundary line

46

R. at 284-397 and 398-402.
R. at 384-397.
48
R. at 384-397, 398-402, and 403-405.
49
R. at 384-397, 398-402, and 403-405.
47

14

between the properties that first began with the fence and then continued with the lilacs, grass,
yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport. Affidavit of Lane V. Erickson Exhibit
“4”.50
The Parkers also testified that they did not know that the legal description written on the
Warranty Deed to the property they sold to the Plaintiffs was different from the boundary line
established by the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport. The Parkers
believed and treated the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport as the
boundary line. (See Second Affidavit of Lane V. Erickson Exhibit “5” pages 9, 13; and Exhibit
“6” pages 15 – 18, 22, 35 – 36, 39, 41 – 42.)51
The Parkers stated that they believed the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed,
driveway and carport as the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the land they owned
(the Nielson Property) based upon their seeing these things for themselves and based upon their
conversations with Jared and Marissa Heaps from whom they purchased the Nielson Property.
(See Second Affidavit of Lane V. Erickson Exhibit “6” pages 46-48.)52

50

R. at 410.
R. at 406-514.
52
R. at 406-514.
51
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues have been identified and/or argued by the Plaintiffs/Appellants in
the Appellants’ Brief:
1.

Whether the District Court properly found that there were no genuine issues of
fact that would preclude summary judgment from being entered in favor of either
the Talbots or the Parkers?

2.

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the
Talbots concerning the boundary between the Talbot Property and the Nielson
Property?

3.

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the
Parkers who provided to the Plaintiffs/Appellants a warranty deed containing a
metes and bounds legal description?

4.

Whether the District Court property ruled against the Plaintiffs/Appellants on
their Motion to Disqualify the counsel of the Talbots and Parkers.

In addition, the Talbots and Parkers identify the following issue on appeal: Whether
Respondents Talbots and Parkers are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal?

16

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ARGUMENT
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
The summary judgment rendered by the District Court in favor of the Respondents

Talbots and Parkers was proper. Summary Judgment is appropriate when “. . . the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to Judgment as a matter
of law.” State v. Rubbermaid, 129 Idaho 353 (1996) citing to McCoy v. Lions, 120 Idaho 765,
769 (1991).
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the
elements challenged by the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,
530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). It is well settled in Idaho that in order to create a
genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must present more than just
conclusory assertions, or assumptions or beliefs that an issue of material fact exists. Van Velson
Corp. v. Westwood Mall Assoc., 126 Idaho 401, 406, 884 P.2d 414, 419, (1994). “Rather, the
[opposing party] must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150, 868 P.2d
473, 478 (1994).
The non-moving party has the obligation of establishing the existence of each element
essential to any claims they have made in which they bear the burden of proof at trial. This
obligation has been imposed by the United States Supreme Court in applying Rule 56(c) of the

17

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the case of Cellotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted Cellotex in the application of Rule 56(c). See, Badell v.
Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102 (1998). In Cellotex, Justice Renquist wrote for the majority and
explained:
The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a
situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is entitled to a
Judgment as a matter of law . . . 477 U.S. at 322-323.
As a result of Cellotex, the Appellant in this case cannot raise merit-less claims to defeat
Summary Judgment. Rather the Appellant must introduce or point to facts in the record that
support each element of each claim asserted in Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint.
In the present case the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
Respondents Talbots and Parkers. The relevant facts, which are cited above and are on the
record before this Court evidence that there was an agreement between the original landowners
concerning where the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property would
be when the original property was divided.53 These original landowners created a deed with a
legal description that they believed reflected the agreement for the boundary line that they had

53

R. at 147-148, and 152-154.
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made which at that time was reflected by a fence.54 The record evidences that the agreed upon
boundary line was always maintained by every owner of the properties through items such as the
fence, lilac bushes, grass, yards, a sprinkler system, a shed, a driveway and a carport from the
time that the property was divided until ownership ended up in the hands of the Talbots and the
Plaintiffs/Appellants several decades later.55
The Plaintiffs/Appellants attempted to create an issue of fact with the District Court to
preclude summary judgment by submitting the Affidavits of Craig Shaffer and Vince
Whitehead.56 However, the Talbots and the Parkers also obtained affidavits from Craig Shaffer
and Vince Whitehead.57 These additional affidavits contained much more testimony from these
witnesses concerning the relevant facts. These additional affidavits evidence that there are no
genuine issues of fact.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs/Appellants attempted to create issues of fact through the
Affidavits of the Plaintiffs/Appellants themselves.58 However, a review of these Affidavits
actually supports the notice that the Plaintiffs/Appellants had about the agreed upon boundary
line. These affidavits describe the shed on one end of the property, the driveway, carport and
lilacs on the other end of the property and the sprinklers, grass and lawn in between those two

54

R. at 147-148, and 152-154.
R. at 410 (as a summary).
56
R. at 231-232, and 250-251.
57
R. at 152-154, and 601-603.
58
R. at 181-183, 227-228, and 567-568.
55

19

ends. The Plaintiffs/Appellants’ claim that they could not see a boundary line is disingenuous
when all of their testimony is read together.
Under these undisputed facts and the applicable law provided to the District Court at
summary judgment and again to this Court herein, there are no issues of material fact. The
undisputed facts provide evidence that the legal boundary line between the Talbot Property and
the Nielson Property remains where it was agreed upon, and where it has been maintained by
every land owner for more than 30 years.59
In response, Plaintiffs/Appellants have provided no additional evidence on the record
upon which either the District Court nor this Court could rely to refute the evidence provided by
the Talbots and Parkers. Rather, the Plaintiffs/Appellants simply attempt to convince this Court
that a different law should apply.
The District Court properly recognized that Plaintiffs/Appellants had failed to meet their
burden of “showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”60 The District Court
properly found that Plaintiffs/Appellants relied upon inapplicable law and had provided no facts
or evidence on the record to contradict the law and the evidence provided by the Talbots and
Parkers.61 As a result, the District Court awarded summary judgment in favor of the Talbots and
Parkers.62

59

R. at 410 (as a summary).
R. at 637-650.
61
R. at 637-650.
62
R. at 651-652.
60

20

All of Plaintiffs/Appellants’ claims in their Complaint fail. There are no remaining valid
causes of action for Plaintiffs/Appellants to pursue, and the dismissal Plaintiffs/Appellants’
Complaint and this litigation by the District Court was proper. This Court should likewise rule
in favor of the Talbots and Parkers and should award them their attorneys fees and costs on
appeal as a result of the frivolous arguments of law made by the Plaintiffs/Appellants.

II.

THIS IS NOT A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE CASE
The District Court properly determined that the present case is not a “boundary by

acquiescence” case when it relied upon this Court’s previous decisions and awarded summary
judgment to the Talbots and Parkers. According to this Court in a previous similar case, “the
fundamental principle underlying all of the rules of construction of deeds, as well as all other
contractual instruments, is that the courts must seek and give effect to the intention of the
parties.” Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, 89, 245 P.2d 1052, 1057 (1952). The general rule
is that monuments, natural or artificial, or lines marked on the ground, control over calls for
courses and distances. Id.
The facts in the present case are similar to those of Campbell. In Campbell, the legal
description in a deed for property that was divided up by the original owner and the recipient of
one part of the property did not accurately reflect the agreement between the parties of where the
boundary line between the divided properties would be. Subsequent litigation ensued with one
party claiming the legal description controlled the boundary line and the other party arguing that
the agreement between them controlled the boundary line. In analyzing the facts this Court
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determined that there was no dispute that a line was agreed upon and marked on the ground
between the parties. After determining these facts, this Court specifically held, “the particular
rule applicable here is that where the seller and the buyer go upon the land and there agree upon
and mark the boundary between the part to be conveyed and the part to be retained by the seller,
the line thus fixed controls the courses and distances set out in the deed.” Campbell, 73 Idaho at
89, 245 P.2d at 1057.
In a subsequent similar case, where the parties that were litigating were successors to the
original owners of the property that had been divided, this Court further declared that an agreed
upon boundary established under the Campbell ruling, “would also be binding upon a successor
in interest of the seller, who purchased with notice of the agreement.” Paurley v. Harris, 75
Idaho 112, 117, 268 P.2d 351, 353 (1954). In defining what actually provides notice of the
agreement to successors of the seller this Court specifically stated,
The boundary, which defendants claim, was clearly marked by a ‘tight board
fence,’ four or five feet in height, and the area on defendants’ side of the fence
was planted to lawn, shrubbery and trees. This would constitute notice to an
intending purchaser, of defendants’ possession. One buying property in the
possession of a third party is put on notice of any claim of title or right of
possession by such third party, which a reasonable investigation would reveal.
Reid v. Duzet, 140 Idaho 389, 393 94 P.3d 694, 698 (2004).
The facts in the present case fit the above cited case law precisely evidencing that this is
not a “boundary by acquiescence” case as argued by the Plaintiffs/Appellants. In the present
case, the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property were originally one parcel of property that
was divided up by the owners Craig and Sue Shaffer, who retained a part of the original property
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(the Nielson Property) and then separated and sold the separated property (the Talbot Property)
to Suel and Gae Murdock. (Shaffer and Murdock Affidavits and Plaintiffs’ Complaint.)63 When
this separation of property occurred, the Talbot Property was enclosed by a standing fence.
(Shaffer and Murdock Affidavits.)64
Further, the record evidences that the Shaffers and the Murdocks specifically agreed and
both testified that the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property would
be the existing fence. (Shaffer and Murdock Affidavits.)65 Additionally, both testify that a deed
was drafted based upon the belief of the Shaffers and the Murdocks that the legal description in
the deed accurately described their agreed upon boundary line as represented by the fence.
(Shaffer and Murdock Affidavits.)66
Over several decades the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property were sold to other
groups of individuals. (See Plaintiff’s Complaint and attached Exhibits.)67 During this time
there was always either the fence or other “monuments, natural or artificial, or lines marked on
the ground” that acted as the boundary between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property.
This is evidenced by the fence, and by the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway
and carport that were established and took the fence’s place when it was removed.

(See

Affidavits of Shaffer, Murdock, Robert Talbot, Cromwell, Larsen, and the depositions of Paul

63

R. at 10-45, 152-154, and 147-148.
R. at 147-148 and 152-154.
65
R. at 147-148 and 152-154.
66
R. at 147-148 and 152-154.
67
R. at 10-45.
64
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and Saundra Parker).68 Based upon the undisputed record before the Court, established by the
Affidavits and testimony of the owners of the property, there was always an agreed upon
boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property beginning with the fence, or
once it was removed, by the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed, driveway and carport that
took the fence’s place. (See the Timeline of Ownership attached as Exhibit 4 to the Second
Affidavit of Lane V. Erickson.)69
When the Plaintiffs/Appellants purchased the Nielson Property about 30 years after the
boundary line was established, these same the lilacs, grass, yards, sprinkler system, shed,
driveway and carport existed that continued the established boundary line.

However, the

Plaintiffs checked the legal description and learned that the Talbot Property actually encroached
upon the legal description of property listed on their deed by about 12 or so feet. (See Plaintiffs’
Complaint.)70 As a result, the Plaintiffs ripped out all of the lilacs, shrubs and plants and then
demanded that the Talbots move their shed, sprinkler system and carport to give them the land
they claimed the legal description on their deed stated they owned.

(See Michele Talbot

Affidavit, and Affidavit of Robert Talbot with Exhibits “1” “2”, and “3”.) 71 The Talbots refused
stating that the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property was where

68

R. at 152-154, 147-148, 384-397, 398-402, 403-405, 414, and 425-430.
R. at 406-514, and specifically Exhibit “4” at 409-410.
70
R. at 10-45.
71
R. at 149-151, and 384-397.
69
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all previous owners had always established it to be based upon the fenceline, lilacs, grass, yards,
sprinkler system and structures existed for decades.72
The facts on the record in the present case are undisputed.73 The general rule set forth by
this Court’s Campbell, decision is concise and unmistakable. Based on these facts it is frivolous
for the Plaintiffs/Appellants to claim that any “boundary by acquiescence” law applies in this
appeal. Plaintiffs/Appellants received the Talbots’ and the Parkers’ brief in support of their
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment.74 This brief clearly set forth the narrow line of cases
that support the applicable law, including the general rule set forth in Campbell.75
Plaintiffs/Appellants have had adequate time to analyze and review this Court’s Campbell,
Paurley, and Reid, decisions. They cannot claim that they did not know about these cases. They
also cannot claim that they did not know what the undisputed facts were. Despite all of this, the
Plaintiffs/Appellants frivolously persist in continuing to argue that the “boundary by
acquiescence” cases apply even when they know that these cases are not applicable. This Court
should deny the Plaintiffs/Appellants’ appeal. This is not a case where the Plaintiffs/Appellants
can make a legitimate argument for an application of any law other than that set forth above.
Based upon the frivolous arguments of law made by the Plaintiffs/Appellants, this Court should

72

R. at 149-151, and 384-397.
R. at 147-148, 149, 151, 152-154, 384-397, 398-402, 403-405, 406-514, 423-447, 601-603,
summarized at 401.
74
R. at 383.
75
R. at 373-375.
73
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enter an award of attorney fees in favor of the Talbots and the Parkers and against the
Plaintiffs/Appellants.

A. LEGAL DESCRIPTION DOES NOT CONTROL THE BOUNDARY LINE
Plaintiffs/Appellants argument that the legal description in the deed they received from
the Parkers should control the boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson
Property fails when held up to the applicable law. In applying this Court’s Campbell, Paurley,
and Reid, decisions to the facts cited above the boundary line between the Talbot Property and
the Nielson Property is established to be where the original parties agreed it was, regardless of
the contrary legal description on the deed. This agreement and the boundary line was evidenced
by the original fence and by the location of the lilacs, grass, yard, sprinkler system, shed,
driveway and carport. This agreement and the boundary line was followed for over 30 years by
all of the previous owners of both properties.
The Plaintiffs/Appellants’ arguments that the legal description should control and/or that
a different law should apply are immaterial. This Court has established the applicable law. As a
result of the undisputed facts set forth on the record, this Court should apply the law that is
represented by this Court’s Campbell, Paurley, and Reid, decisions. This is not a case where the
law of “boundary by acquiescence” is applicable. Likewise, this is not a case where the legal
description controls the boundary line. Rather, this is a case that must follow this Court’s
previously declared narrow line of cases that apply when the original owner divides the property
and agrees with the buyer about the boundary line. The District Court’s decision that the
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boundary line between the properties remains where it existed for over 30 years despite the
contrary legal description should be upheld. Plaintiffs/Appellants’ should be denied.

B.

EVIDENCE OF NOTICE TO PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS ABOUT THE
EXISTING BOUNDARY

Plaintiffs/Appellants argument that there is no evidence of their knowledge of the
existing boundary line also fails. As was set forth above, this Court declared that an agreed upon
boundary established under the Campbell ruling, “would also be binding upon a successor in
interest of the seller, who purchased with notice of the agreement.” Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho
112, 117, 268 P.2d 351, 353 (1954). In defining what actually provides notice of the agreement
to successors of the seller this Court specifically stated,
The boundary, which defendants claim, was clearly marked by a ‘tight board
fence,’ four or five feet in height, and the area on defendants’ side of the fence
was planted to lawn, shrubbery and trees. This would constitute notice to an
intending purchaser, of defendants’ possession. One buying property in the
possession of a third party is put on notice of any claim of title or right of
possession by such third party, which a reasonable investigation would reveal.
Reid v. Duzet, 140 Idaho 389, 393 94 P.3d 694, 698 (2004).
In the present case, the “notice” the Plaintiffs/Appellants received concerning the agreed
upon boundary line was provided by the location of the lilacs, grass, yard, sprinkler system, shed,
driveway and carport that existed creating a boundary line between the Talbot Property and the
Nielson Property when the Plaintiffs/Appellants purchased the Nielson Property.

The

Plaintiffs/Appellants did not even need to conduct a “reasonable investigation.” The boundary
line was obvious. The lilacs, driveway and carport on the front end, the sprinklers, grass and
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yard in the middle and the shed on the other end created an observable and recognizable
boundary line. The “notice” required by Reid, was provided.
With the evidence and record before this Court, the Plaintiffs/Appellants’ argument that
they didn’t have “knowledge” of the agreed upon boundary line is unreasonable. The record
establishes an agreed upon boundary line between the Talbot Property and the Nielson Property
that existed for decades. The record also establishes that the Plaintiffs/Appellants had notice
sufficient to satisfy the Reid, requirements.
Based upon the actual applicable cases, and the record, this Court should enter an Order
upholding the District Court’s summary judgment decision in favor of the Talbots and the
Parkers. Further, this Court should enter an Order which defines the boundary line between the
Talbot Property and the Nielson Property to be exactly where all of the previous parties agreed
and maintained it to be. For these reasons, the Court should deny Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal
and enter a decision in favor of the Talbots and the Parkers.

III.

THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS WARRANTY OF TITLE CLAIM MUST FAIL
Because the boundary between the Nielson Property and the Talbot Property is

established by Idaho law, as set forth in Section II above, Plaintiff’s warranty of title or duty to
defend claim against the Parkers should be dismissed. In the present case, the District Court
applied the correct law and found that the Campbell case controlled the boundary line between
the Nielson Property and the Talbot Property. The District Court also correctly determined that
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the Warranty of Title claim of the Plaintiffs/Appellants failed due to this Court’s Paurley,
decision.
In applying the Campbell, Paurley, and Reid, decisions, the Plaintiffs/Appellants are
successors in interest with notice of the agreement that altered or changed the meets and bounds
descriptions in the original written deeds. These same meets and bounds descriptions have been
handed down between all of the successors in interest to both the Nielson Property and the
Talbot Property. Under this Court’s Campbell, Paurley, and Reid, decisions, all of the successor
deeds, including that received by the Plaintiffs/Appellants from the Parkers, were altered and/or
changed by the agreed upon boundary evidenced and followed by all previous owners of the
properties. For this reason, the Warranty Deed provided to the Plaintiffs/Appellants by the
Parkers, in its changed state, is accurate and cannot be the source of any claim for Breach of
Warranty of Title and/or Duty to Defend in favor of the Plaintiffs/Appellants. As a result,
Plaintiffs/Appellants’ appeal of the District Court’s decision concerning their claim of Warranty
of Title against the Parkers should be denied.

IV.

PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS’ CLAIM TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL MUST FAIL
As with all previous claims and arguments, Plaintiffs/Appellants’ claim that counsel for

the Talbots and the Parkers must be disqualified due to an alleged conflict is not supported by the
facts or the law and should therefore be denied. The applicable laws as set forth in this Court’s
Campbell, Paurley, and Reid, decisions, which are analyzed above, all evidence that there are no
conflicts of interest between the Talbots and the Parkers in the present case.
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However, even if there was a conflict of interest between the Talbots and the Parkers,
Plaintiffs/Appellants conducted the deposition of the Parkers and there learned that the Parkers
and the Talbots had agreed to work together on this matter, thereby eliminating any such conflict
of

interest.76

Additionally,

during

these

same

depositions,

as

counsel

for

the

Plaintiffs/Appellants was inquiring about why the Parkers had not defended the Nielsons against
the claims brought by the Talbots, testimony was provided that claimed the attorney client
privilege.77 The Parkers testified that they had had several discussions and meetings with the
Talbots where they all agreed to work together to resolve the claims of the Plaintiffs/Appellants
because they were all in agreement of what the boundary line was between the Talbot Property
and the Nielson Property.78
The Talbots and the Parkers acknowledge that if this Court’s Campbell, Paurley, and
Reid, decisions did not exist, and the undisputed facts in this case were not as they are, then there
might be a conflict between them. However, this is not the case. The law is straight forward.
The facts concerning the boundary line are not in dispute. The facts and the law both evidence
that there is no conflict of interest between the Talbots and the Parkers. To claim that there is a
conflict of interest when there is no support in either the law or the facts is frivolous. Worse, to
claim that the “boundary by acquiescence” laws create a conflict of interest is an intentional
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R. at 428 (depo page 20 lines 4-9).
R. at 430 (depo pages 28-29).
78
R. at 431-432.
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effort to mislead this Court.

For these reasons, this Court should deny the appeal of the

Plaintiffs/Appellants and award attorneys fees and costs to the Talbots and the Parkers.

V.

AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
Respondents Talbots and Parkers are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on

appeal pursuant to applicable Idaho law. According to the relevant and applicable sections of
Idaho Code § 12-121, and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) the Idaho Supreme Court “may award reasonable
attorney’s fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” Further, Rule 11 of the
I.A.R requires every party to represent to the Court that every pleading, written motion, or other
paper that is filed “is not interposed for any improper purpose.” Further this Rule requires every
party to represent to the Court that its appeal and the arguments made therein are “warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose.” I.A.R. Rule 11(a). When there is a violation
of this rule, the Court can impose an appropriate sanction, including an order to pay the other
parties’ reasonable attorney fees. I.A.R. Rule 11(a).
In the present case, in their appeal, the Plaintiffs/Appellants attempt to do the same thing
that was done before the District Court, which is to unreasonably insist and try and convince this
Court to apply law that is clearly not applicable under the relevant facts and circumstances of this
case. Further, the Plaintiffs/Appellants attempt to convince this Court, just as it attempted to
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convince the District Court, that the District Court was required to disqualify the Talbots' and
Parkers'

attorney

pursuant

to

the

Idaho

Rules

of Professional

Conduct.

The

Plaintiffs/Appellants' appeal and arguments have been brought frivolously, unreasonably and
without a foundation or basis in applicable law.

The Plaintiffs/Appellants have made no

arguments in their appeal for the "extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Rather,
the Plaintiffs/Appellants simply try to force non-applicable law into this case, even after having
had ample and adequate time to fully analyze the law that does apply. For these reasons, the
Court should find the Plaintiffs/Appellants' appeal to be unreasonable and frivolous, that the
Talbots and Parkers are the prevailing parties and award the Talbots and Parkers their attorney
fees and costs from this appeal.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that the District Court's Decisions
granting summary judgment and denying Plaintiffs/Appellants' motion for reconsideration in
favor of the Talbots and the Parkers be affnmed in their entirety. Further, the Talbots and the
Parkers respectfully request that they be awarded their attorney fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this

ih day of September, 2017.
RACINE, OLSON, NYE,
& BUDGE, CHARTERED

LANE V. ERICKSON, of the finn
Attorneys for Respondents
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7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
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